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The Tribunal considered that the Applicant did not establish the required irreparable damage. First, the Tribunal noted that the Applicant did not submit that she faced loss of employment or income, but rather that her placement on ALWP was “detrimental and harmful to her professional work and reputation”. Second, by arguing that “she [would] have to painstakingly re-establish her credibility and authority” and “rehabilitate” her professional image, she was, in fact, arguing that these aspects can be repaired. Third, the Applicant did not provide any supporting documentation, such as a medical...

The Tribunal initially ordered that, in accordance with the Appeals Tribunal in Villamoran 2011-UNAT-160, the contested should not be implemented during pendency of the present proceedings and before it had adjudicated all matters of the present case.

As the Applicant filed the application to the Dispute Tribunal after the selection had already been implemented, the application for suspension of action was therefore not receivable.

UNAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. UNAT held that appeals against decisions taken during proceedings are receivable only in exceptional circumstances where UNDT has manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction. UNAT held that even though UNDT may have committed a procedural error, it had not exceeded its jurisdiction. UNAT dismissed the appeal.

UNAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. On the award of costs, UNAT held that the calling of a witness in good faith and with the reasonable aim to bolster the views of the Administration did not constitute an abuse of process warranting the award of legal costs and granted the appeal on that point. UNAT dismissed the Secretary-General’s appeal of the award of prospective compensation of the monetary equivalent of the Special Post Allowance for an uncertain duration. UNAT found no merit in the Secretary-General’s appeal against the award of compensation for loss of opportunity...

The evidence and submissions on record are insufficient to determine the material issue as to whether the Appellant’s claim for compensation totaled less than, or in excess of, USD 25,000, in order to determine the authority of the Secretary of the ABCC to take the contested administrative decision. Hence the remand to UNDT to determine whether the Secretary of the ABCC had the valid power to take the contested decision.

Two types of interim measures - with different functions, preconditions, restrictions and scope - have to be clearly distinguished. Art. 13 RoP has to be applied exclusively during the pendency of the management evaluation, whereas art. 14 RoP is appropriate only during judicial review in terms of art. 2 and 8 Statute; in short: it is either 13 or 14 – never both. Orders based on art. 13 RoP become ineffective with the end of management evaluation. The present application had to be considered under art. 13 RoP since the contested decision of 12 October 2009 was released under new conditions...

The Applicant’s due process rights were violated when his computer hard drive was seized in violation of sec. 8.5(a) of ST/STGB/2004/15. However, by giving him notice and inviting him to be present when the ICT data were being accessed the Administration accorded him his due process rights in accordance with sec. 8.5(b)(i) of ST/STGB/2004/15; The JAB’s review of his case was unconscionably delayed and procedurally flawed. The Respondent bears responsibility for this; The JDC process was proper and fair. The consideration by the investigation panel and the Report of the JDC were soundly based...

The application was withdrawn by the applicant.

The UNDT found that the decision that the Applicant was not eligible for consideration for conversion to a permanent appointment was lawful.

The administrative instruction ST/AI/2011/6 (Mobility allowance), which superseded ST/AI/2007/1 (Mobility allowance), was applicable to the Applicant’s request for mobility allowance submitted in January 2012. ST/AI/2011/6 included the requirement of five years of continuous service in the United Nations common system, which in the present case was not fulfilled. The Tribunal found that the Applicant was not eligible because she did not meet one of the requirements for payment of the mobility allowance, namely five years of continuous service in the United Nations common system.